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E.

MOORE*

A

FTER long neglect, particularly on the part of social scientists,
the topic of social change is now fashionable. It appears that
the experts have belatedly recognized what the general populace
knew all along, that we are in the midst of change of unprecedented
scope and speed, and the end is not in sight. Reflections on social
change are not novel, of course. Retrospective reflections, particularly by older persons, often yield views of less than total enthusiasm
for alterations in standards, conventions, and even magnitudes of
social relations. Awareness of current rapid change, however, is
relatively recent but now widespread. Even more novel, and less
widespread, is the awareness that much of our changing situation
is the consequence of deliberate action - the intended result or a
by-product of decisions and plans.
The new awareness of change has caused some overdue reconsideration of theoretical and methodological models in fields such
as my own discipline of sociology. Our theory and our analytical
procedures are primarily designed to detect and predict interdependence rather than trends or sequences. The crisis in that discipline
need not detain us here, except that we must be warned that the
repertory of scientific principles and procedures that might clarify
the current confusion is in fact meager. Yet we must press on
bravely, for rapid change presents new problems in both private and
public sectors of our society. We must approach them as sensibly
as we can.
I shall use the term social structure in a very general sense:
patterned behavior. Thus phenomena as widely different as the
temporal pattern of traffic flows and the modes of formal organization in business corporations are comprised in the concept. The
minimum components of a social structure are roles, which are standardized actions expected of occupants of positions, conforming to
rules that govern role behavior and thus the relationships among
positions. This abstract way of characterizing social structure has
*Sociologist, Russell Sage Foundation; Visiting lecturer with the rank of Professor of
Sociology, Princeton University; A.B., Linfield College; Ph.D., Harvard University.
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the virtue, already noted, of encompassing any patterned behavior
and thus permitting attention to relationships across a wide spectrum
of differences in scale. It should be noted in passing that we are not
equating social structure with status gradations - as often occurs
in the writings of economists, for example. Rather, the forms of
social inequality represent sub-types of the generic term structure.
The abstract definition of social structure leaves much too much
latitude for a relatively brief and coherent discussion. One mode
of simplifying organization would be to attend to the major institutional contexts of social behavior, such as the family, religion, education, the economy, and the polity. One consequence of adopting
this alternative would be a reinvention of the chapter titles of introductory sociology texts, which is not an evil prospect per se, but still
presents an impossibly formidable agenda for this occasion.
The alternative we have adopted is to focus attention on certain
pervasive processes of change, processes that impinge on the family,
the economy, the polity, and so on. These processes we shall identify
as differentiation, organization, and participation, each comprising
several sub-sets of social transformations. We shall find that these
processes are not wholly autonomous but rather intersecting (in federal prose, interdigitated) patterns of change.
I.

DIFFERENTIATION

Despite mountainous mole-hills of prose from subterranean
critics of contemporary society, I can find no substantial and credible
evidence for the dismal doctrine of "mass culture." The supposedly
stultifying standardization produced by the mass media has at most
resulted in some superficial commonalities: fashions, fads, and the
latest, volatile "in" vocabulary and status symbols. Yet even language, which would seem most subject to standardization, retains
its authentic regional accents, and all sorts of other differences abide
and abound.
A. Growth and Specialization
Continuing specialization of roles and organizations is often
taken as a sort of datum in the analysis of social change, a kind of
prime mover not itself explained. I suggest that in American society
we can identify three sources of specialization: (1) population
growth and increasing density, providing opportunities for specialization and virtually assuring it; (2) the rapid growth of knowledge
and of rational technique, so that any individual can command only
a small portion of the total stock; (3) the rapid expansion of options
in both products and practices, permitting discretionary choices and
novel combinations by eclectic mixture.
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Occupational specialization' is certainly the most conspicuous
form of rapid differentiation of adult roles. Some of the historic
effect of technical changes in productive processes, and the one that
invited the most critical cominent, has been the dilution of skills
through the subdivision of tasks. At no time, however, has this
form of specialization been the unique or sovereign tendency, since
an increasingly complex productive system has also demanded new
skills and new skill combinations. The long-term trend has been for
an upgrading of the minimum and average skill levels, and the most
modern productive technology restores to production workers a large
measure of machine mastery.
Occupational specialization exemplifies the intersection of increased size of units and increased useful knowledge to be translated into productive tasks. Yet just as the less-skilled worker is
threatened by actual displacement by mechanization, the highly
skilled worker and the professional are threatened by technical obsolescence by failure to keep pace with the expansion of relevant knowledge, and the modern manager is by no means exempt from the
demand to be a learner throughout his career. Indeed, the manager
is now faced with unprecedented complexity, for in most instances
he cannot pretend to be a leader and exemplar by being more skilled
than any of his subordinates. His prime role now is that of coordinator of specialists; in a sense, his prior authority is impaired while
his task becomes more complex.'
Specialization is also exemplified in the wondrous range of organizational forms, not only to produce and distribute goods and
services or to govern and maintain order, but to prosecute special
interests or indulge in various recreational and expressive activities.
Although many organizations may "just happen," a wondrous amount
of time and energy is spent in inventing organizations; eclecticism
is a conspicuous feature of new organizations.
Organizational specialization has gone so far that it is difficult
to find a broad-purpose-the sociological term is "functionally
diffuse" - organization beyond the family. Some genuine neighborhoods exist, and a few genuine communities, but these are not immune to the divisive or at least fractionating effects of specialized
organizations. As the family has become about the only place where
an individual may legitimately display an emotion, it sometimes
cracks under the strain. Yet the demise of the family as a functionally important unit of society is not imminent.
1 See Moore, Changes in OccupationalStructures, in SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND MOBILITY
IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ch. VI (N. Smelser & S. Lipset eds. 1966).
2 See W. MOORE, THE CONDUCT OF THE COR'ORATION ch. IV (1966).
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Eclecticism is a conspicuous feature in styles of life. For the
lowest income sectors, market choice is of course radically restricted.
For others, the tremendous variety of alternative goods and services
permits a wider choice. (Incidentally, for the marketing-minded, the
moral is clear: income is a poor predictor of life styles. Education
and occupation will predict part of the differences better than income
levels.)
Specialization, whether of occupations, organizations or styles
of life, poses problems of coordination. We shall return later to
organization as our second pervasive process, for coordination is by
no means automatic.
B. Inequality, Old and New
The notion of America as a "classless" society has not been taken
seriously by scholars, but I feel, with decreasing justification. Not
that the United States has ever had a genuinely equalitarian social
order, nor is that precisely the trend. Rather, the semblance of
hereditary strata, never absolute, has been steadily eroded by very
strong intergenerational mobility and by the lack of sharp discontinuities across most of the status distributions in the society. The
closest approaches to genuine strata are to be found at the very top
and very bottom of income or other status differentials. Neither
"class" is impermeable, but there are strong tendencies to self-perpetuation. For the substantial majority of the population the term
"middle mass" has been suggested,' though that suggests a homogeneity that does not exist. Rather, there are multiple gradations
on one or another basis of ranking, but inconsistencies abound, the
distinctions are often fine and somewhat arbitrary, and mobility is
widespread between generations and within careers. Again, the
tendency of Americans to identify themselves in polls and sample
surveys as "middle class" may be more accurate than the views of
critics who find this behavior amusing.
We should not leave the subject of inequality without a comment on poverty, now so much in public discussion. Aside from the
aged and those having one or another disability -which constitute
a fair portion of the poor 4 - the problem of poverty involves the
hereditary poor. As long as there is a range of income distributions,
those at the lower end are relatively poor. But if the range is relatively narrow, the minima tolerably high, and the avenues of mobility by merit open, the inequality would be relatively consistent
with our professed values. The current difficulties are several: (1)
3 Wilensky, Orderly Careers and Social Participation:The Impact of Work History on

Social Integration in the Middle Mass, 26 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 521,539 (1961).
4 See Rein & Miller, Poverty, Policy, and Purpose: The Dilemmas of Choice, in EcoNOMIC PROGRESS AND SOCIAL WELFARE ch. III (L. Goodman ed. 1960).
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The general rise in levels of income and in broadening opportunities
has left some segments of the population behind - mainly Negroes
and some rural whites. (2) Poverty has become a minority phenomenon, and thus does not command widespread engagement for alleviating the problem. (3) Certain structural changes such as the
increased reliance on formal education as an intergenerational mechanism of mobility and occupational sorting device may have actually
decreased the opportunities for escape. To the degree that mechanical aptitudes, athletic ability, or entrepreneurial skill for starting a
small business become progressively shut off as mobility opportunities, the occupational system becomes less open despite other
expanded opportunities. Of course, the culturally deprived child
does not even have "access to motivation" to want to achieve even
when the opportunities are nominally open. 5 A very considerable
social ingenuity will be required to overcome this structural defect
in American society.
C. Ecological Redistribution
Another form of social differentiation might appear at first
glance to represent increasing homogeneity through urbanization.
Certainly the rapid pace of rural-urban migration, together with the
impact of modern transportation and communication on towns and
villages, has radically reduced the "cultural" and even the organizational differences between city and country. However, the urbanization process has led to new forms of differentiation that seriously
challenge the capacity of "inherited institutions" to cope with the
complexity.
The "invasion" of central cities by Negroes (and, especially
in the East, by Puerto Ricans) perpetuates a long-established pattern
of ethnic concentration by successive immigrant groups. However,
the assimilation of ethnic groups into the main stream of American
life has proved to be conspicuously more difficult where "racial"
distinctions are drawn. Dispersion of Negroes, occupationally and
especially residentially, appears to be a very slow process. Meanwhile, and in some part owing to the concentration of Negroes in
central cities, the process of suburbanization goes on apace. In larger
metropolitan complexes, suburbs become differentiated, not only by
income level but also by other social characteristics; some suburbs
are quiet, some "swinging," some "cultural" and some recreational.
Yet the common problems of metropolitan areas - air and stream
pollution, traffic congestion, the provision of public services - are
difficult or impossible to solve by traditional modes of political or5

See J. COLEMAN and others, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (U.S. Dep't

of Health, Education, and Welfare Publication, 1966).
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ganization. Again, substantial social inventiveness will be required
to avoid an increasingly chaotic style of social differentiation.
D. Pluralism
The notion of American society as a "melting pot," assimilating diverse national and ethnic stocks into a single, homogeneous
amalgam, had the disadvantage of most metaphors: exaggeration.
Regional, ethnic, political, and religious differences persist, intersect, and add new elements of diversity in American social behavior.
These differences represent a partial conspectus of tolerable disagreements; others include such preferences as cuisine, artistic taste,
or form of recreation. Arguments may occur, with occasional emotion and even hostility, but divisions are either highly regularized
-as
in political parties- or recognized as not commanding preemptive allegiance.
The view adopted here is that pluralism is growing rather than
decreasing in American society. More traditional sources of difference have been supplemented by newer forms of differentiation based
on education and occupation. The result is far from a homogeneous
community, but it is not necessarily one full of conflict or disorder.
Two principal dangers are evident in the rampant American
pluralism: one is the ever-present possibility that common values or
goal-orientations will be undermined or forgotten in the quest for
distinctiveness. Secondly, some differences may come to be treated
invidiously, some preferences or traditional differences may be regarded as unacceptable, and persistent allegiance to them may lead
to segregation and discrimination. American history and contemporary American society offer ample examples of successful pluralism
and of dangerous divisiveness.
[Tjhe greatest perils of pluralism come not so much from
frontal oppositions but from such a degree of discretionary specialization that a common identity or a common culture is lost to a host of
diverse organizational interests. The other side of tolerance
is in6
difference, and that may go to the point of disengagement.
II. ORGANIZATION

Virtually everything that engages more than one person's interests gets organized in American society. The independent craftsman,
tradesman, or professional is a diminishing category, and many a
repairman handles the accounts of franchised dealers, and many a
professional nominally in private practice is in fact in group practice
or partnership. Even play gets organized: conspicuously so in the
case of commercialized- it is a mistake to say professionalized 6 W.

MOORE, The Individual in an OrganizationalSociety, in ORDER AND CHANGE:

ESSAYS IN COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGY 226 (1967).
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spectator sports, but also in country clubs, bridge clubs, collectors'
societies, and, so help me, girl watching societies. Traditional individualism is steadily eroded by the conformity-demands of nominally
immortal organizations, which exist prior to the individual's tour of
duty, and will survive him despite his possibly disruptive acts. 7 In
effect, however, the traditionally treasured individualism was not a
pure and simple ideal, but had its highest relevance in the notion
of an atomistic and impersonal market for goods and services. And
since organized production and organized distribution have been
characteristic of industrialism since its inception, individualism often
came to mean the inequitable irresponsibility of exploitative employers or individualism by default rather than by design for the
individual who did not exactly fit into the conventional arrangements.
Why should organizations multiply, and become more complex?
Certainly a major part of the answer lies with social differentiation,
already examined. And the character of contemporary differentiation is such that common understandings and the unspoken consensus
must be increasingly rare. Aims become explicated, means for their
achievement worked out, and formal groups set up for mobilizing
effort and assigning tasks to participants. It used to be difficult to
distinguish between apathy and simple contentment with ongoing
arrangements; now apathy means a genuine withdrawal, for informal arrangements do not serve, and formal ones require positive
participation.
A. Bureaucratization
By now the word has fina!ly got around: bureaucracy is not an
evil, do-nothing complex of offices uniquely characterizing national
governments, but a type of organization to be found wherever numbers of specialized task-performers are coordinated in a system of
graded steps of authority. Private corporations are as bureaucratic,
by any of the standard tests, as are public agencies. The extension
of bureaucracy, or administrative organization, into most of the
world of work has not entirely dissipated the negative connotation
of th1e original term. The reason for that is that size and specialization produce formalization of rules and procedures, of job specifications and the jurisdictions of components. There is as much tendency
to formulate and apply rules mindlessly in the corporate world as
in the publicly-supported agency.
The simplest measure of bureaucratization is the proportion of
wage and salary earners among those gainfully occupied. It will
scarcely be surprising that this ratio is highly correlated with the
level of economic development, taken comparatively among coun7

See W. WHYTE, JR., THE ORGANIZATION IMAN (1956).
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tries at a point of time, and also increases with the level of economic
performance. In the United States this proportion exceeds fourfifths of the labor force. 8
Subordination is partly softened by widespread sharing, and
specialization further softens the authority of superiors, as already
noted. Nevertheless, the intersection between individual personality
and organized, collective goals must always be partial except for
the patently pathological bureaucrat (often, unfortunately, an executive) who has no other interest in life.
Public and private bureaucracies share some irrational tendencies,
which I cannot here document in detail:' overstaffing with needless
subordinates, who merely add to the entourage of administrators,
but not to the efficacy of performing the mission; overstaffing with
advisers of dubious value, on the chance that their magic will work,
or on the grounds that some competitor has seen fit to add such
an advisory function; a proliferation of essentially silly rules and
controls, based originally on some real or imagined human frailty,
and mindlessly applied thereafter to otherwise conscientious and
possibly creative employees.
Every bureaucratic organization of substantial size (say, one
hundred members or more) faces the perennial dilemma of centralization for the sake of uniformity and decentralization for the sake
of temporal efficiency (not to mention the morale of lesser managers and workers). There is no known perfect solution to this
problem. The primary tendency is toward centralization, but reversals occur, and occasionally leave some residue of autonomy with
component units. The growing technical specialization of nominally
subordinate units is a powerful basis for localism.
Bureaucracies commonly have been supposed to be inflexible,
almost crystalline structures. The virtues of predictable continuity
in performance do indeed encourage a kind of rule-regarding posture. Yet the very diversity now built into the personnel of administrative organizations assures some discord in non-routine decisions,
and the fact that various staff specialists have external clienteles
assures further lack of harmony. Despite the depressingly negative
connotations of the term bureaucracy, there is a remarkable flexibility in such organizations in responding to external or internal
stimuli.
Yet the stimuli generated are diverse, and the arguments propounded by advisers far from consensual. The old-style executive
would not have tolerated such a discordant chorus and he would
have made any decision on the basis of accumulated experience.
8 See Moore, supra note 1.
9

See W. MOORE, supra note 2.
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Experience is not now despicable, but it is known to be untrustworthy. The contemporary executive is trained in rational decision
processes, with variable inputs of information and advice, and with
variable credibility ratings and weights in the composite outcome.
He may not be more often right; but in view of increased complexity
and uncertainty, he is fortunate if he is not more often wrong.
Perhaps the most important feature of contemporary bureaucratic organization - and that feature grows apace - is the attempt
to predict, cause, and control social change, and not merely react to
environmental alterations. "Research and development" accounts
for a growing proportion of corporate budgets, whether from their
own funds or on governmental contracts. Universities, too, have
greatly expanded research activities, to the degree that in most of
the nominally private institutions more than half of the annual
budget comes from federal sources. To these components of "the
knowledge industry"1 we must add research agencies within government and a great proliferation of not-for-profit organizations engaged exclusively in research. Technology has become a major component of investment policy, both private and public.
There is a very popular notion abroad in the land that technology is
an automatic, autonomous, and indeed sovereign source of social
change. This idea is, of course, much admired by technologists, for
after all that makes them leaders, but it will not pass muster as a
social theory. To a remarkable degree, in the modern world every
economy or society gets about the technology that it deserves, or at
least what it is able and willing to support.1 1
We have weapons rather than clean streams, moon shots rather
than efficient urban transit, packaging machines but no depackaging
machines because real decision-makers have allotted resources and
mobilized talents for some changes and not for others.
The organization and institutionalization of change adds a considerable measure of predictability to outcomes, though accidents
and unforeseen by-products will occur, and successive attempts will
be made to bring those under control also.
There is another, and troublesome, aspect to the pervasively
organized character of American life. To a growing degree decisions
are "collective," made on behalf of others by persons in essentially
fiduciary positions. Consider assets. Certainly the major part of our
total national assets are held by units of government or by private
corporations and various non-profit organizations. They are held
in one form or another of trust, and decisions about them are not
made in the first instance by beneficiaries. I do not suggest that we
IOSee

generally F. MACHLUP, THE

PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE IN

THE UNITED STATES (1962).

11W. MOORE, The Impact of Technological Change on Industrial Organization, in
ORDER AND CHANGE, supra note 6, at 88.
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attempt to turn the clock back, to return to days that were better
only through nostalgic distortion. I do suggest that the conduct of
fiduciaries, whether public officials or corporate executives, is not
clearly governed by rules that will assure equity to the various interests involved. One can confidently expect successive attempts to
clarify rights and responsibilities, to make power "responsible."
B. Voluntarism
The bureaucratization of productive tasks does not end the
pervasive character of organization. Both interest-oriented and expressive associations appear to multiply faster than the general
growth of population, and undoubtedly reflect the increasing formalization of relationships associated with urbanization, and the increasing differentiation of positions and life styles. Though organizations do offer new forms of social participation, a point to which
we shall return, the voluntarism that they exemplify is not untainted.
The interest-oriented association is for some cause and thus against
others. Those whose interests would be adversely affected by the
association's success are virtually forced into a counter-organization.
The right to be a non-joiner is being steadily eroded, and about
that we may perhaps be allowed a faint note of regret.
III. PARTICIPATION

American society has always fallen well short of the democratic
ideal of universal adult participation in political processes. Aside
from residential, educational, and property qualifications for the
franchise - qualifications gradually liberalized over the long term
- the citizenry has exhibited considerable apathy. Some of the
apathy certainly has been associated with lack of local community
ties, poor education, and poverty, even if those impediments do not
constitute formal disqualifications. The extemely low participation
by urban Negroes in anti-poverty programs designed to elicit some
sharing of decisions is now widely known. Yet civil rights activities
have attracted somewhat wider participation. Indeed, there may be
a somewhat justifiable suspicion that conventional political organizations, and perhaps even novel ones that are externally sponsored,
aim at co-opting rather than genuinely renresenting Negroes and
other essentially disfranchised sectors of the population. As broader
participation is pressed, we may continue to witness various forms
of unconventional politics. New forms of participation may well
challenge the constituted order, and may indeed here and there go
well beyond the tolerable limits for the maintenance of public safety.
Yet they bespeak involvement rather than apathy, and may lead to
genuine improvement in the society's operation.
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There is a further development in all post-industrial societies
that merits attention. All such societies have become "welfare
states" in various forms and degrees. One consequence of such
welfare policies is to extend the common rights and privileges of
citizenship - that is, simply being part of the society - in contrast
to the differential claims to income and prestige from competitive
or essentially chance sources (such as property inheritance) .12 To
educational, political, and labor force participation may be added
access to various services, including medical and legal ones. Creeping
socialism this may be - though many private corporations have long
recognized certain uniform claims on services. I should prefer to
call it creeping democracy as long as we keep private alternatives to
public programs.
CONCLUSION

The very rapidity of contemporary change may lead to the mistaken impression that all is in flux. Yet some change remains gradual
and essentially evolutionary. The family's emergence as the major
source of personal integrity has been gradual. Our political system
is also essentially evolutionary, though it could be argued that its
change has been unduly slow in the management of such problems
as those confronting metropolitan areas.
We should also note that some values and rules have a hardy
survival power. Aside from such collective values as national patriotism and such commonly held individual values as longevity,
health, and economic well-being, we also share such expectations
as punctuality and trust. Perhaps even more important than these
enduring values and expectations, and particularly in view of continuous differentiation, is the continuing reliance on the procedures
for resolving differences. According to circumstances we rely on
the democratic vote, bargaining and negotiation, and, if necessary,
judicial processes that provide for litigation of disputes through
advocacy on the part of adversaries. On the whole, these prove to be
effective "tension-management" devices. Even if we may have to
invent new ways of coping with problems, these are likely to endure.

12
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